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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ten years ago, I published an article in the Marquette Intellectual 
Property Law Review titled, “Trademark Exhaustion in the European 
Union: Community-Wide or International? The Saga Continues.”1  In 
that article, I described the development of the principle of trademark 
exhaustion in the European Union (EU) and analyzed the interplay 
among trademark protection, trademark territoriality, and the 
treatment of the parallel importation of gray market products—
unauthorized genuine goods imported from foreign countries—under 
Article 7 of the Trademark Directive (Article 7).  Article 7 was the first 
provision that directly addressed the exhaustion of trademark rights in 
the EU and harmonized the national laws of EU Member States.2  
During the late 1990s, the main question in this area was primarily 
whether the language of Article 7(1)3 permits the importation into a EU 
Member State of gray market products exclusively when the products 
have been put into the market in the European Economic Area (EEA)4 
 
1.  Irene Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union: Community-Wide or 
International?  The Saga Continues, 6 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 47 (2002) [hereinafter 
Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union]. 
2.  Article 7 of Council Directive 89/104, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1 (EEC), now replaced by 
European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/95, 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25 (EC) [hereinafter 
Trademark Directive].  For a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the Trademark 
Directive and the drafting process of Article 7 on the exhaustion of trademark rights, see 
Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union, supra note 1, at 60. The same 
principle was repeated verbatim in Article 13 of the Community Trademark Regulation. See 
Article 13 of Council Regulation 40/94, Dec. 20, 1993 on the Community Trade Mark, 1994 
O.J. (L 011) 1 (EC), now replaced by Council Regulation 207/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1 (EC) 
[hereinafter CTM Regulation].  On the developments of the principle of trademark 
exhaustion in the European Union [hereinafter EU], see Friedrich-Karl Beier, Industrial 
Property and the Free Movement of Goods in the Internal European Market, 21 I.I.C. 131 
(1990) [hereinafter Beier, Industrial Property]; Friedrich-Karl Beier, The Doctrine of 
Exhaustion in EEC Trademark Law—Scope and Limits, 10 I.I.C. 20 (1979) [hereinafter 
Beier, Exhaustion in EEC Trademark Law]; Herman Cohen Jehoram, Harmonising 
Intellectual Property Law Within the European Community, 23 I.I.C. 622 (1992); Ulrich 
Löwenheim, Trademarks and European Community Law, 9 I.I.C. 422 (1978); Willem Mak, 
Trademarks and the European Common Market, 6 I.I.C. 29 (1975). 
3.  Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive provides that trademark owners cannot 
“prohibit [the] use [of a mark] in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the 
Community under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent.” Trademark 
Directive, supra note 2, at art. 7(1). 
4.  The adoption of the Agreement for the European Economic Area (EEA) of May 2, 
1992, extended this principle to the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) countries 
joining the EEA (Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein). See Annex XVII and Article 2(1) of 
the Protocol to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, Jan. 3, 1994, O.J. (L 1) 3, 
which extends the effect of Article 7 of the Trademark Directive to the EEA from January 1, 
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or whether, instead, the provision also permits the importation of gray 
market products when the products have first been distributed outside 
the EEA.5  Although Article 7(1) states that trademark rights have to be 
considered exhausted with respect to products that are “put on to the 
market in the Community” (Community-wide or EEA exhaustion), the 
provision does not expressly exclude, in fact, the possibility for 
individual Members States to extend this principle to products put into 
the market outside the EEA (International exhaustion).6 
As I described in my 2002 article, this ambiguity led to several years 
of heated debate over the geographical application—Community-wide 
or International?—of the principle of trademark exhaustion in the EU.7  
In turn, because of this ambiguity, national courts repeatedly referred 
questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or 
Court) to clarify the interpretation of Article 7(1), namely, whether 
individual Member States could apply the broader standard of 
international exhaustion within their national territories.8  In the late 
1990s and early 2000s, the CJEU then issued a series of decisions, in 
which the Court invariably stated that Article 7(1) had to be interpreted 
as establishing a general principle of Community-wide trademark 
exhaustion to be applied in all Member States.  This principle, the Court 
repeated, was not just a minimum standard, but the exclusive standard 
 
1994.  For a more elaborated analysis of the relationship between free movement of products 
and trademark exhaustion in free trade areas, see Irene Calboli, Market Integration and (The 
Limits of) The First Sale Rule In North American and European Trademark Law, 51 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1241 (2011) [hereinafter Calboli, Market Integration]. 
5.  See Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union, supra note 1, at 60–66.  
6.  Id. at 49, fn. 8 (noting that the Court of Justice of the European Union “developed 
the principle of Community-wide exhaustion independently” and that “the laws of some 
countries, such as Germany, the Benelux Countries, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, 
generally accepted the principle of ‘international exhaustion,’ while other European 
jurisdictions, such as France, Italy, and Spain, opted for the principle of ‘national 
exhaustion’”).  See also Nicholas Shea, Does the First Trade Mark Directive Allow 
International Exhaustion of Rights?, 10 E.I.P.R. 463, 463 (1995) (recounting the 
disagreements over the interpretation of the provision and the geographical application of the 
principle of trademark exhaustion in the EU).  
7.  Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union, supra note 1, at 60–66.  
8.  See Case C-335/96, Silhouette Int’l Schimed Gmbh & Co. KG v. Hartlauer 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 30 I.I.C. 920 (1998); Case-173/98, Sebago, Inc. v. GB-Unic SA, 2 
C.M.L.R. 1317 (1999); Joined Cases C-414-416/99, Zino Davidoff SA v. A & G Imports Ltd., 
Levi Strauss & Co. v. Tesco Stores Ltd., and Levi Strauss & Co. v. Costco Wholesale UK 
Ltd., 2001 E.C.R. I-8691. Professor F. K. Beier, the Director of the Max-Planck Institute for 
Intellectual Property, Competition, and Tax Law also supported the position that individual 
Member States could adopt a broader standard. See Beier, Industrial Property, supra note 2, 
at 156–60. 
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for trademark exhaustion for all Member States, including those 
previously practicing international exhaustion within their national 
territories.9  Despite these decisions, in the early 2000s European 
institutions and interested parties continued nonetheless to consider 
whether a change from EEA-wide exhaustion toward international 
trademark exhaustion could be possible or desirable within the EU 
(EEA).10  Ultimately, however, after several rounds of consultations 
between European institutions, consumer associations, and 
representatives of the industry, no change was suggested to the text of 
Article 7(1).  The principle of EEA-wide exhaustion was thus confirmed 
as the only applicable principle within the territory of the EEA11 or, as it 
has often been defined by commentators, “Fortress Europe.”12 
Hence, even if the CJEU’s decisions seemed to resolve the issues 
related to the territorial application of the principle of trademark 
exhaustion in the EU (EEA), some important developments have 
continued to characterize this area.  Notably, during the past decade, 
national courts have referred additional questions to the CJEU 
regarding the interpretation of Article 7, primarily with respect to the 
interpretation of the notion of “trademark owner’s consent” in the 
language of Article 7(1).  In particular, national courts have asked the 
CJEU to clarify under what circumstances trademark owners should be 
deemed to “have consented” to the distribution of the products into the 
EEA market under Article 7(1), and, thus, have exhausted the ability to 
 
9.  See Silhouette, 30 I.I.C. 920.  In Silhouette, the CJEU ruled that “[n]ational rules 
providing for exhaustion of trade-mark rights in respect of products put on the market 
outside the EEA under that mark by the proprietor or with its consent are contrary to Article 
7(1).”  Id. at ¶ 31. For discussions of this case, see Jochen Pagenberg, The Exhaustion 
Principle and “Silhouette” Case, 30 I.I.C. 19 (1999); Thomas Hays, The Silhouette Case: The 
European Union Moves to the Highest Common Denominator on the Gray Market Question, 
88 TRADEMARK REP. 234 (1998); Thomas Hays & Peter Hansen, Silhouette is not the Proper 
Case Upon Which to Decide the Parallel Importation Question, 1998 E.I.P.R. 277.  The Court 
confirmed this position in Sebago, (1999) C.M.L.R. 1317 and in Zino Davidoff & Levi Strauss, 
2001 E.C.R. I-8691.  But see Case C-306/96, Javico Int’l & Javico AG v. Yves Saint Laurent 
Parfums SA, 1998 E.C.R. I-1983 (where the CJEU adopted a different position based upon 
the antitrust provisions of the EC Treaty). 
10.  Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union, supra note 1, at 83. See 
also Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights: Working Document from the Commission Services, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/intprop/indprop/exhaust.htm (Dec. 9, 1999) 
[hereinafter Commission Working Paper on Trademark Exhaustion].  
11.  Id. 
12.  See, e.g., Herman Cohen Jehoram, Prohibition of Parallel Imports Through 
Intellectual Property Rights, 30 I.I.C. 495, 503 (1999); Carl Steele, “Fortresse Europe” for 
Trademark Owners, 1998 Trademark World 14 (Aug. 1998). 
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enforce their trademark rights with respect to the further distribution of 
those products.13  In addition, national courts have asked the CJEU to 
clarify the language of Article 7(2) of the Trademark Directive, and 
specifically what constitutes a “legitimate reason” under Article 7(2) to 
limit the application of the principle of trademark exhaustion and to 
oppose the further circulation of marked products after their first sale in 
the market, even in instances where the products have been first 
distributed into the market in the EEA.14 
In this Essay I continue to explore, ten years after my 2002 article, 
the development of the principle of trademark exhaustion in the EU.15  
In particular, I analyze the recent jurisprudence of the CJEU on the 
application of Article 7 and recount the most relevant trends in the 
recent CJEU’s decisions in this area.  Although the focus of this Essay is 
primarily descriptive, I offer some critical considerations in the light of 
recent CJEU’s decisions.  I thus argue that in its recent line of cases, the 
CJEU seems increasingly willing to shrink, de facto, the application of 
the principle of trademark exhaustion not solely to products imported 
from outside the EEA, but also to intra-EEA trade.  Most notably, I 
highlight that the CJEU seems to have accepted a narrow interpretation 
of the notion of trademark owners’ “consent” under Article 7(1) of the 
Trademark Directive.  I also argue that the CJEU seems to have 
adopted an alarmingly broad interpretation of what can constitute a 
 
13.  See discussion infra Part II.  
14.  Article 7(2) of the Trademark Directive provides that trademark exhaustion “shall 
not apply where there exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further 
commercialization of the goods . . . .”  Trademark Directive, supra note 2, at art. 7(2).  
15.  This Essay focuses exclusively on the analysis of the recent decisions of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union [hereinafter CJEU or Court] with respect to the principle 
of trademark exhaustion, notably the interpretation of Article 7 of the Trademark Directive.  
Because of its limited scope, this Essay only aims to provide a description and some limited 
criticism of these decisions.  Similarly, this Essay neither addresses relevant issues related to 
the relationship between the free movement of goods and parallel trade, nor elaborates on 
the economic aspects, positive and negative, of parallel imports for corporations and national 
economies.  Finally, this Essay does not address the interplay between the application of the 
principle trademark exhaustion and the enlargement of the European Union during the past 
decade.  Generally, on the principle of trademark exhaustion, see Friedrich-Karl Beier, 
Territoriality of Trademark Law and International Trade, 1 I.I.C. 48 (1970) [hereinafter Beier, 
Territoriality of Trademark Law]; Christopher Heath, Parallel Imports and International 
Trade, 28 I.I.C. 623 (1997); John C. Hilke, Free Trading or Free-Riding: An Examination of 
the Theories and Available Empirical Evidence on Gray Market Imports, 31 WORLD 
COMPETITION L & ECON. REV.  75 (1988); Herman Cohen Jehoram, Prohibition of Parallel 
Imports Through Intellectual Property Rights, 30 I.I.C. 495 (1999); E.C. Vandenburgh, The 
Problem of Importation of Genuinely Marked Goods is not a Trademark Problem, 49 
TRADEMARK REP. 707 (1959).   
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“legitimate reason” to oppose trademark exhaustion under Article 7(2), 
especially to protect famous marks and luxury goods against 
unauthorized trade by third party importers, still within the EEA.  This 
trend, I conclude, is troubling and may negatively impact the principle 
of free movement of goods within the EU/EEA.  Furthermore, it grants 
trademark owners (primarily the owners of famous marks) an 
increasingly absolute right to control the distribution of their marked 
products in the after-sale market—precisely what the principle of 
trademark exhaustion is supposed to prevent—to the detriment of 
consumers and market competition. 
II. RECENT DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION ON TRADEMARK EXHAUSTION 
In this Part, I offer an overview of the most recent decisions issued 
by the CJEU on the interpretation of Article 7 of the Trademark 
Directive with particular attention to the notion of “trademark owner’s 
consent” under Article 7(1) and the concept of “legitimate reasons” that 
trademark owners can raise to oppose the further commercialization of 
the marked products after their distribution into the EEA under Article 
7(2). 
A. Makro Zelfbedieningsgroothandel v. Diesel S.p.A. 
As I pointed out in my 2002 article,16 the CJEU first addressed the 
interpretation of “consent” under Article 7(1) of the Trademark 
Directive in Sebago17 and Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss18 in the late 
1990s and early 2000s.  These cases addressed the question of whether 
trademark owners could be assumed to have consented to the 
(unauthorized) importation of their products into the EEA after the 
same products had been put into the market with trademark owners’ 
consent outside of the EEA.19  In both cases, the CJEU denied that 
 
16.  Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union, supra note 1, at 71–83.  
17.  Case-173/98, Sebago, Inc. v. GB-Unic SA, 2 C.M.L.R. 1317 (1999). 
18.  Joined Cases C-414-416/99, Zino Davidoff SA v. A & G Imports Ltd., Levi Strauss 
& Co. v. Tesco Stores Ltd., and Levi Strauss & Co. v. Costco Wholesale UK Ltd., 2001 
E.C.R. I-8691. 
19.  Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union, supra note 1, at 71–83. For 
a criticism of these cases, see Irini A. Stamatoudi & Paul L.C. Torremans, International 
Exhaustion in the European Union in the Light of “Zino Davidoff”: Contract Versus Trade 
Mark Law?, 31 I.I.C. 123, 140 (2000); W. R. Cornish, Trade Marks: Portcullis for the EEA?, 
[1998] E.I.P.R. 174, 176. 
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trademark owners had consented to the importation of the goods into 
the EEA even if they had consented to the distribution of the products 
abroad.20  In 2009, in Makro Zelfbedieningsgroothandel, the CJEU 
addressed the meaning of “consent” under Article 7(1) again, this time 
in the context of intra-EEA trade.21  To briefly summarize the facts, 
Distributions Italian Fashion S.A., (Difsa), the distributor of Diesel 
products in Spain, Portugal, and Andorra, granted Flexi Casual the 
exclusive right to sell Diesel products in those countries.22  Flexi, 
however, without the approval of Difsa or Diesel, entered into a 
separate licensing agreement with Cosmos World S.L. to distribute 
Diesel products. Cosmos then sold Diesel shoes to Makro, who in turn 
began selling the shoes in the Netherlands.23  Diesel brought suit against 
Makro alleging copyright and trademark infringement on the grounds 
that Diesel did not consent to Cosmos’ marketing of the shoes.  Both 
the Dutch trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Diesel.24  
Makro appealed to the Hoge Raad, asserting that Diesel’s trademark 
rights were exhausted under Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive 
because Cosmos had marketed the shoes in question with Diesel’s 
consent.25  Unclear on how to proceed, the Hoge Raad referred to the 
CJEU to clarify whether consent could be “implied” in “the case where 
[the] goods . . . have first been placed on the market within the EEA, 
but not by [the trademark owner himself] or with his express consent.”26 
Responding to the Hoge Raad’s question, the CJEU first repeated, 
as it had pointed out in Sebago and Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss, that 
consent “constitutes the decisive factor”27 when determining whether a 
trademark owner’s rights are exhausted under Article 7, and that such 
consent should be “unequivocally demonstrated.”28  The Court also 
indicated that, contrary to the facts in this case, consent “will normally 
 
20.  Id. (citing Silhouette, 1998 E.T.M.R. 539, at ¶ 31; Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. 1317, at ¶ 
22).  
21.  Case C-324/08, Makro Zelfbedieningsgroothandel CV v. Diesel SpA., 2009 E.C.R. 
I-10019. 
22.  Id. at ¶ 8. 
23.  Id. at ¶ 11. 
24.  Id. at ¶ 14. 
25.  Id. at ¶ 15. 
26.  Makro, 2009 E.C.R. I-10019, at ¶ 17. 
27.  Id. at ¶ 22. See Amanda Easey & Rohan Massey, Parallel Imports: Consent by 
Conduct, 3 J. Intell. Prop. Law & Prac. 642 (2008).   
28.  Id. (citing Case C-59/08, Copad, SA v. Christian Dior Couture SA, 2009 E.C.R I-
03421, ¶ 42). 
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be gathered from an express statement.”29  The CJEU admitted, 
however, that in certain instances, such as in the presence of licensing 
agreements, consent may be inferred “from the facts and circumstances 
prior to, simultaneous with or subsequent to the placing of the goods on 
the market in that area” when, in the view of the national court, these 
facts and circumstances “unequivocally demonstrate that the proprietor 
has renounced his exclusive rights.”30  Lastly, the Court observed that, 
also in the case where the products were first distributed into an EEA 
country, national courts could assess whether trademark owners had 
“implicitly consented” to the first distribution of the goods (and 
exhausted their trademark rights) by using the same test that the CJEU 
had developed in Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss.  National courts could 
do so despite the fact that the CJEU developed that test with respect to 
products, which were first marketed outside the EEA and later 
imported into the EEA.31  Based upon this test, the Court seemed to 
ultimately indicate that Diesel did not consent to Cosmos’ sale of Diesel 
products to Makro, that Diesel’s trademark rights were not exhausted, 
and that Diesel could legitimately oppose Makro’s sale in the 
Netherlands.32 
B. Copad SA v. Christian Dior Couture SA 
In 2009, the CJEU revisited what may constitute “consent” under 
Article 7(1), also in Copad SA v. Christian Dior Couture SA.33  The main 
focus of this case, however, was the interplay between the principle of 
trademark exhaustion and the breach of a distribution clause in a 
licensing agreement.  Notably, this case dealt with whether this breach 
of contract could, first, fall within the reasons to deny “trademark 
owners’ consent” under Article 7(1) and, second, whether it could also 
represent a “legitimate reason” to oppose the products’ further 
distribution in the EEA under Article 7(2).34  In this case, SIL, an 
official licensee of Dior, sold luxury goods bearing the Christian Dior 
trademark to Copad, a discount store chain outside of the distribution 
network expressly defined in the license agreement between SIL and 
 
29.  Id. ¶ 24 (citing Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss, 2001 E.C.R. I-8691, ¶ 46; Copad, 
2009 E.C.R. I-03421, at ¶ 42). 
30.  Id. at ¶ 23–25 (citing Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss, 2001 E.C.R. I-8691at ¶ 46). 
31.  Id. at ¶ 29. 
32.  Id. at ¶ 35.  
33.  Case C-59/08, Copad SA v. Christian Dior Couture SA, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421. 
34.  See id. at ¶ 14. 
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Dior,35 and against Dior’s express denial to such sales.36  Arguing that 
the licensing agreement expressly prohibited sales to discount stores in 
order to “maintain the repute and prestige” of the mark,37 Dior brought 
suit before the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Bobigny against both 
SIL and Copad for trademark infringement.38  The Tribunal held, 
however, that the breach of the license agreement did not give rise to 
liability for trademark infringement, but only to liability under a breach 
of contract theory.39 Dior appealed.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
lower court on the finding that SIL’s actions only gave rise to 
contractual liability.40  Still, the Court of Appeals found that SIL’s sales 
to Copad did not imply exhaustion of Dior’s trademark rights for 
purposes of Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive.41  Copad appealed 
the finding of non-exhaustion to the Court of Cassation, and Dior cross-
appealed on the basis of infringement.42 
The Court of Cassation stayed proceedings and referred several 
questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.43  Specifically, with 
respect to Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive, the Court of 
Cassation asked whether the fact that a licensee put “goods bearing a 
trade mark on the market in the [EEA] in disregard of a provision of 
the licensing agreement prohibiting, on grounds of the trade mark’s 
prestige, sale to discount stores” needed to be interpreted as if the 
licensee had sold the goods “without the consent” of the trademark 
owner.44  Should that be the case, the Court of Cassation also asked, 
“can the proprietor [then] invoke such a provision to oppose further 
commercialization of the goods, on the basis of Article 7(2) of [the 
Directive]?”45 
 
35.  Id. at ¶¶ 9–10. 
36.  Id. at ¶ 9 (The original licensing agreement stated “in order to maintain the repute 
and prestige of the trade mark the licensee agrees not to sell to wholesalers, buyers’ 
collectives, discount stores, mail order companies, door-to-door sales companies or 
companies selling within private houses without prior written agreement from the licensor, 
and must make all necessary provision to ensure that the rule is complied with by its 
distributors or retailers.”).  
37.  Id. at ¶ 8.  
38.  Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421. 
39.  Id.  
40.  Id.  
41.  Id. at ¶ 12.  
42.  Id. at ¶ 13.  
43.  Id. at ¶ 14.  
44.  Id.  
45.  Id. 
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The CJEU’s decision in this case marked one of the most important 
victories for owners of luxury marks in the EU in recent years. In its 
decision, the CJEU accepted that the allure and prestige of a mark, in 
addition to the material elements of a product, can directly contribute to 
the quality of the products.46  The CJEU affirmed, in particular, that the 
breach of a licensing agreement, like the one between SIL and Dior, 
could damage the “allure and prestigious image which bestows on those 
goods an aura of luxury.”  Notably, the Court stated that this breach of 
contract could fall within the provisions enumerated in Article 8(2) of 
the Trademark Directive, which lists the causes of action that trademark 
owners can enforce against licensees.47  This finding impacted, in turn, 
the Court’s answers on the interpretation of Article 7.  In this respect, 
the Court said that, generally, a licensee is considered as having put the 
goods onto the market with the consent of the trademark owner. Yet, 
the Court stated that if a licensee sells luxury goods in a manner that 
breaches his licensing agreement, and such breach of contract falls 
within Article 8(2) of the Directive, the general principle does not 
apply, thus trademark owners’ rights cannot be considered exhausted 
within the meaning of Article 7(1) because trademark owners did not 
consent to the sale of the trademarked items.48  Furthermore, the CJEU 
said that, with respect to the interpretation of Article 7(2), a licensee’s 
breach of a contractual clause in the licensing agreement can qualify as a 
“legitimate reason” under Article 7(2) to oppose future sales of the 
trademarked good by a discount store if it can be established that the 
resale would damage the reputation of the trademark.49  The Court did 
not give specific guidance, however, as to how to determine such 
damage to the reputation and left such determination to the national 
courts on a case-by-case basis.50 
C. Coty Prestige Lancaster Group GmbH v. Simex Trading AG 
One year later, in 2010, the CJEU again addressed a question 
regarding the interpretation of “trademark owner’s consent” under 
Article 7(1) in Coty Prestige Lancaster Group.51  This time, the Court 
 
46.  Id. at ¶¶ 24–26.  
47.  Id. at ¶ 30. 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id.  
50.  Id. at ¶ 31.  
51.  Case C-127/09, Coty Prestige Lancaster Group GmbH v. Simex Trading AG, 2010 
E.C.R. I-04965. 
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specifically clarified the meaning of the language “putting on the market 
[with trademark owner’s consent]” in that provision.52  In this case, Coty, 
a perfume manufacturer, marketed its products through selective 
distribution channels with “authorized specialist dealers”53 to whom 
Coty provided marketing and advertising materials free of charge.54  
Coty expressly prohibited, however, any “commercial use on the part of 
the authorized specialist dealer [of the materials], particular[ly] the sale 
of samples, testers or miniatures.”55  Regardless of these contractual 
clauses, Simex, a third party distributor, was able to provide two testers 
of Coty’s perfumes to a retail store in Germany.  These testers were 
genuine perfumes, which had been packaged differently and had been 
labeled with the wording “Demonstration” and “Not for Sale.”56  The 
testers had been supplied to Simex by a within-network Coty dealer in 
Singapore.57  Claiming that this unauthorized sale violated its trademark 
rights, Coty sought an injunction against Simex in Germany on the basis 
that the testers were put on the EEA market for the first time without 
Coty’s consent.58  Against this claim, Simex asserted that the testers had 
been put on the market with Coty’s consent, and that therefore Coty’s 
rights were exhausted.59  The trial court ruled in favor of Simex, 
reasoning that Coty had transferred the testers to dealers, and thus had 
granted its permission to use the perfumes.60  Coty appealed, and the 
Court of Appeals referred to the CJEU a question to clarify the 
meaning of the language “placement on the market” with “trademark 
owner’s consent” under Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive.61 
The CJEU answered the question referred by the German Court of 
Appeals by first repeating its conclusion in Sebago62 that under Article 
7(1) trademark rights are considered exhausted not with respect to a 
whole category of goods, but only with respect to the “individual items 
of the product which have first been put on the market in the EEA by 
 
52.  Id. at ¶ 49. 
53.  Id. at ¶ 8.  
54.  Id. at ¶ 9.  
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. at ¶ 12.  
57.  Id. at ¶ 15.  
58.  Id.  
59.  Id. at ¶ 16. 
60.  Id. at ¶ 20.  
61.  Id. at ¶ 26. 
62.  Id. at ¶ 31 (citing Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. 1317 at ¶¶ 19–20); see also Calboli, 
Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union, supra note 1, at 71. 
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the proprietor or with his consent.”63  The Court then analyzed whether 
Coty’s rights in the particular products at issue were exhausted based 
upon this general principle.  Ultimately, the CJEU concluded that 
Coty’s rights with regards to the products at issue were not exhausted.  
The Court also repeated that, in abstract, “consent” for purpose of 
trademark exhaustion under Article 7 can be either express or implied 
from the circumstances.  Yet the Court noted that consent can be 
implied only if the circumstances unequivocally demonstrate that 
trademark owners have renounced their right to be first to place the 
goods onto the market in the EEA.64  In addition, the CJEU pointed out 
that the issue of consent is one to be decided by the national courts. In 
this case, the CJEU noted that a finding of consent was precluded due 
to the fact that the testers’ bottles were clearly marked “not for sale,” 
which unequivocally indicated that Coty did not consent to their sale 
and thus precluded the possibility that Coty’s rights could be exhausted 
under Article 7(1).65 
D. Portakabin Ltd. v. Primakabin, BV 
Again in 2010, the CJEU dealt with another aspect of trademark 
exhaustion and addressed the interplay between the principle of 
exhaustion and the legal treatment of keyword advertising in the case 
Portakabin Ltd. v. Primakabin, BV.66  Portakabin, a manufacturer of 
mobile buildings, brought actions against Primakabin, a second-hand 
dealer of mobile buildings, including those manufactured by Portakabin 
in the Netherlands.67  Through the Google AdWords service, 
Primakabin purchased the words “portakabin,” “portacabin,” 
“portokabin,” and “portocabin” to drive consumers to its website during 
their Internet searches.68  The heading that accompanied the ad on the 
Internet included the wording “used portakabins.”69  Portakabin sought 
an order requiring Primakabin to cease using all signs similar to its 
 
63.  Coty Prestige, 2010 E.C.R. I-04965 at ¶ 31 (stating “neither the initial provision by 
Coty Prestige of items of the goods at issue in the main proceedings to its authorized 
specialist dealer established in Singapore nor the supply by Coty Prestige to its authorized 
specialist dealers established in the EEA of other items of the same product may be 
considered to be a putting on the market within the meaning of Article 7(1).”). 
64.  Id. at ¶ 38. 
65.  Id. at ¶ 43. 
66.  Case C-558/08, Portakabin Ltd. v. Primakabin BV, 2010 E.C.R. I-06959. 
67.  Id. at ¶ 13.  
68.  Id. at ¶ 16.  
69.  Id. at ¶ 17.  
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mark, including all of the keywords that Primakabin had purchased for 
use in the AdWords system.70  The Dutch trial court, however, found 
that Primakabin had not used the word “portakabin” to distinguish 
goods, and that Primakabin was not gaining an unfair advantage over 
Portakabin by using any of the keywords that it had purchased.71  
Portakabin appealed.  On appeal, the Dutch Court of Appeals 
prohibited Primakabin from both engaging in advertising that contained 
the words “used portakabins,” and from linking directly to its own 
webpage through the use of variants of the word “portakabin.”72  
Portakabin appealed to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, which 
stayed proceedings and referred questions to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling.73  Among these questions, the Dutch Supreme Court 
requested clarification on the application of Article 7 of the Trademark 
Directive “where an offer by the advertiser . . . relates to goods which 
have been marketed in the European Community [by the trademark 
owner or with its consent].”74 
Responding to the question, the CJEU first repeated the general 
principle that trademark rights are exhausted upon the first sale of the 
products in the EEA by trademark owners or with their consent.75  The 
Court then highlighted that the Portakabin mobile buildings had been 
placed on the market in the EEA by Portakabin under its trademark, 
and that the products were being further commercialized by 
Primakabin.76  The Court also stated that trademark owners can oppose 
the further commercialization of their products if there are “legitimate 
reasons” to do so.77  In the case at issue the Court said, such “legitimate 
reasons” could exist only if the advertiser’s use of a keyword identical or 
similar to the trademark in question could seriously damage the 
reputation of the mark.  Otherwise, a trademark owner could not 
prohibit an advertiser from using a keyword similar or identical to 
his/her trademark.78  The CJEU also (unusually) gave specific directions 
to the national courts that would rule on this and similar cases and 
 
70.  Id. at ¶ 18.  
71.  Id. at ¶ 20. 
72.  Id. at ¶ 21.  
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. 
75.  Id. at ¶ 74.  
76.  Id. at ¶ 76.  
77.  Trademark Directive, supra note 2, at art. 7(2). 
78.  Portakabin, 2010 E.C.R. I-06959 at ¶ 78. 
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stated that national courts cannot find a “legitimate reason” merely 
based on the fact that an advertiser uses another’s trademark with 
additional wording such as “used” or “second hand.”79  The Court 
observed, however, that national courts are obligated to find a 
“legitimate reason” where the reseller has used a keyword similar or 
identical to a trademark and has removed or concealed the trademark 
from the goods.80  Still, the Court added that national courts must find 
that “specialist” retailers (such as retailers of “used portakabins”) 
cannot be prohibited from using a mark for the purpose of advertising 
its resale activities which include the sale of other second-hand goods, 81 
unless selling the other second-hand goods would risk seriously 
damaging the image or reputation of the mark.82 
E. L’Oreal v. eBay 
Most recently, in 2011, the CJEU once again dealt with the issue of 
cosmetics that were marked “not for sale” as in Coty Prestige, in the 
case L’Oreal v. eBay,83 this time in the context of unauthorized sales in 
the online marketplace.84  EBay, a famous online auction house, 
operates an online marketplace where goods are offered for sale and 
bought by third party eBay customers.85  In the case at issue, several of 
L’Oreal’s products were placed for sale on eBay.  Among these items 
were products that, although not meant for sale in the EEA, eventually 
entered into the EEA without the consent of L’Oreal.86  As a general 
practice, L’Oreal uses a selective distribution network and controls its 
sales by means of contracts with authorized distributors.87  Because of 
these unauthorized sales on eBay, L’Oreal sent eBay a letter in 2007 
expressing its concerns regarding the sale of infringing products on 
eBay’s site, and requested that eBay take steps to investigate these 
concerns.88  Unsatisfied with eBay’s response, L’Oreal brought an action 
 
79.  Id. at ¶¶ 89–91. 
80.  Id. at ¶ 93. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. See also Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421, at ¶ 24. 
83.  Case C-324/09, L’Oreal SA v. eBay, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-324/09. 
84.  Id. at ¶ 1.  
85.  Id. at ¶ 2.  
86.  Id. at ¶ 28. 
87.  Id. at ¶ 27.  
88.  Id. at ¶ 32.   
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before the High Court of Justice of England and Wales in order to 
obtain a ruling that eBay users had infringed its trademarks,89 and that 
eBay was jointly liable for the infringement.90  The High Court stayed 
proceedings and referred several questions to the CJEU. Among these 
questions, the High Court asked the CJEU to clarify the application of 
Article 7(1) to this case, in particular with respect to the language “put 
in the market,” and to clarify the application of Article 7(2) and the 
interpretation of the language “legitimate reasons” to oppose trademark 
exhaustion with respect to online marketplaces such as eBay.91 
In July 2011, the CJEU issued its decision on the case.  With respect 
to the question related to the interpretation of Article 7(1) and the 
meaning of the language “put in the market,” the Court repeated its 
holding in Coty Prestige where it stated that the products at issue were 
not “put on the market” within the meaning of Article 7(1).92  
Specifically, the Court stated that under Article 7(1), if the goods are 
clearly marked “not for sale,” trademark owners’ rights cannot be 
considered exhausted even if the products have been first distributed 
within the EEA.93  In addition, the Court stated that trademark owners 
could rely on Article 7(2) and oppose further sales of their products if 
the boxes or outer packaging of the products have been removed or 
replaced, when such removal may affect “essential information,”94 such 
as in the case where “information relating to the identity of the 
manufacturer or the person responsible for marketing the cosmetic 
product is missing”95 or when “the removal of the packaging has 
damaged the image of the product and, hence, the trade mark’s 
reputation.”96  Yet, the Court also stated that the finding of such 
“legitimate reasons” to oppose further commercialization of the goods 
remains dependent on the specific facts of the case, and did not directly 
elaborate on any example where L’Oreal’s image could likely be 
damaged.97 
 
89.  Id. at ¶¶ 34–35. 
90.  Id. at ¶ 36.  
91.  Id. at ¶¶ 43–44.  
92.  Id. at ¶ 65.  
93.  Id. at ¶ 72. 
94.  Id. at ¶ 83. 
95.  Id. at ¶ 81. 
96.  Id. at ¶ 83. 
97.  Id. 
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F. Joined Cases Orifarm AS and Paranova AS v. Merck Sharp & 
Dohme 
Finally, in July 2011, the CJEU again addressed the interpretation of 
Article 7(2) of the Trademark Directive in the joined cases of Orifarm 
and Paranova.98  Both cases were referred by the Danish Supreme Court 
and concerned the question of whether trademark rights are infringed 
when a pharmaceutical product is imported by a company under 
authorization, but the importing company asks a third party to 
repackage the products, even if it ultimately lists itself as the 
repackaging company on the products’ packages.99  In particular, in the 
cases at issue, Merck sued Orifarm and Paranova in Denmark alleging 
trademark infringement because the companies had wrongly identified 
themselves as the repackagers of the products in question and, as a 
result, Merck’s consumers could be misled.100  Merck argued that 
although Article 7(1) of the Trademark Directive prohibits trademark 
owners to further control the distribution of their products after their 
first sale in the market, Article 7(2) provides an exception to this rule 
based upon the existence of “a legitimate reason.”  According to Merck, 
the failure to disclose the identity of the actual repackager constituted 
such a “legitimate reason.”101  In the Orifarm case, the Danish district 
court ruled in favor of Merck.102  Similarly, in the Paranova case, the 
same court granted an injunction prohibiting Paranova from selling the 
products in question where the packaging did not accurately reflect the 
identity of the repackager.103  Both decisions were appealed to the 
Supreme Court, which in both instances referred a question to the 
CJEU.104 
Interestingly, the CJEU disagreed with the Danish district court and 
held that defendants had not infringed Merck’s marks simply because 
defendants had failed to disclose the identity of the repackager.105  The 
Court mentioned some of its previous decisions in which it specified that 
 
98.  Joined Cases C-400/09 and C-207/10, Orifarm v. Merck and Paranova v. Merck, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009CJ0400:EN:HTML.  
99.    Id. at ¶ 1. 
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. at ¶ 22. 
102.  Id. at ¶ 11. 
103.  Id. at ¶ 17. 
104.  Id. at ¶ 12. 
105.  Id. at ¶ 36. 
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one of the conditions under which a parallel importer should repackage 
pharmaceutical products was, in fact, that the new packaging clearly 
indicates the repackager of the product and the name of the 
manufacturer.106  Still, in the cases at issue, the CJEU rejected Merck’s 
argument that consumers have an interest in knowing the name of the 
actual repackager of the products.107  Notably, the CJEU stressed that 
the provision of Article 7(2)—the legitimate reason to oppose the 
exhaustion of trademark rights—is designed to protect exclusively the 
interest of trademark owners, and not the consumers.  Instead, the 
consumers should rely upon other legal instruments to protect their 
interests.108  In these cases the Court found trademark owners’ rights 
were sufficiently protected by the possibility of holding the repackager 
of the product or the distributor liable if the original condition of the 
product was affected by the repackaging or the repackaging was likely 
to damage the reputation of the mark.109  To the contrary, in the absence 
of any material changes to the original conditions of the products, the 
CJEU concluded that trademark owners cannot object to the parallel 
import of repackaged pharmaceutical products based only on the fact 
that the company listed as importer may have instructed a sister 
company to effect the logistics of the repackaging in practice.110 
III. EEA-WIDE TRADEMARK EXHAUSTION UNDER ATTACK? 
As the decisions summarized above demonstrate, the interpretation 
of Article 7 of the Trademark Directive and the application of the 
principle of trademark exhaustion in the EU continues to be the subject 
of heated debates and controversies.111  Different from the debates of 
the late 1990s, however, national courts seem to have accepted as a fait 
 
106.  Id. at ¶ 27 (citing Case C-276/05, The Wellcome Foundation, Ltd. v. Paranova, 
2008 E.C.R. I-10479; Case C-348/04, Boehringer v. Swingward, Ltd., 2007 E.C.R. I-03391).   
107.  Id. at ¶¶ 34–35. 
108.  Id. at ¶ 33. 
109.  Id.  
110.  Id. at ¶ 36. 
111. See Orifarm & Paranova, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009CJ0400: EN:HTML; L’Oreal, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-324/09;  Coty Prestige, 2010 E.C.R. 
I-04965; Portakabin, 2010 E.C.R. I-06959; Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421; Makro, 2009 E.C.R. I-
10019.  See also Eike Ullmann, Reconciling Trade Mark Decisions of National Courts and the 
European Court of Justice, 27 I.I.C. 791 (1996); INGE GOVAERE, THE USE AND ABUSE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN E.C. LAW 157 (1996); Ulrich Löwenheim, Intellectual 
Property Before the European Court of Justice, 26 I.I.C. 829 (1995). 
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accompli that trademark exhaustion in the EEA only applies after the 
first authorized sale of the products in one of the EEA Member 
States.112  Instead, in recent years, national courts primarily asked the 
CJEU to clarify the meaning of the notion of “trademark owner’s 
consent [to the distribution of the products in the EEA]” in the 
language of Article 7(1),113 and to elaborate on what represents a 
“legitimate reason” to oppose the further circulation of the marked 
products even after the first sale in the EEA market against the 
application of the principle of trademark exhaustion under Article 
7(2).114 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the recent jurisprudence of the CJEU 
continues to raise serious concerns as to the future application of the 
principle of trademark exhaustion, even with respect to intra-EEA 
parallel trade.  Particularly, the recent jurisprudence of the CJEU in this 
area seems to indicate that the CJEU has consistently adopted an 
increasingly narrow interpretation of the language of Article 7 of the 
Trademark Directive.  This narrow interpretation is effectively 
shrinking the application of the principle of trademark exhaustion even 
with respect to products legitimately distributed in the EEA.115  
Specifically, in its recent decisions, the CJEU seem to have accepted an 
interpretation of the notion of trademark owners’ “consent” under 
Article 7(1) that may prevent courts from finding that trademark 
owners have “consented” to the distribution of their products into the 
EEA (and have exhausted their trademark rights with respect to those 
products), unless trademark owners have given their “express and 
unequivocal” consent to such distribution.116  Additionally, the recent 
jurisprudence of the CJEU seems to indicate that the CJEU has 
adopted an ever broader interpretation of what can constitute a 
 
112.  See discussion supra Introduction. 
113. See L’Oreal, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-324/09; Coty Prestige, 2010 E.C.R. I-04965; Copad, 2009 
E.C.R. I-03421, Makro, 2009 E.C.R. I-10019. 
114. See Orifarm & Paranova, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009CJ0400: EN:HTML; L’Oreal, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-324/09; Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-
03241. 
115.  See discussion supra Part II. 
116. See Orifarm & Paranova available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009CJ0400: EN:HTML; L’Oreal, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-324/09; Portakabin, 2010 E.C.R. I-
06959; Coty Prestige, 2010 E.C.R. I-04965; Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03241; Makro, 2009 E.C.R. I-
10019. 
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“legitimate reason” to oppose the further commercialization of the 
marked products after the first sale in the EEA under Article 7(2), and 
thus trademark exhaustion.  This is particularly pertinent in instances 
where trademark owners wish to protect famous marks and luxury 
goods against unauthorized parallel trade.117 
Most notably, with respect to the questions over the interpretation 
of “consent” under Article 7(1), the CJEU has repeated, at first, the 
position that it previously articulated in the cases Sebago and Zino 
Davidoff and Levi Strauss.118  The Court has noted that consent cannot 
be inferred or implied from the fact that the goods in question do not 
carry ad hoc labels that prohibit their resale in the EEA, or by the fact 
that trademark owners do not expressly impose contractual restrictions 
outside the EEA prohibiting the re-sale of the goods in the EEA.119  
Along the same lines, the CJEU has specified that the fact of making 
“testers” available to dealers could not be interpreted as if trademark 
owners had consented to the subsequent sale of those testers, 
particularly when the testers were marked “not for sale.”120  More 
problematic, the CJEU has also stated that the notion of consent under 
Article 7(1) can extend to acts carried out by licensees or by entities 
economically linked to trademark owners.  Specifically, the Court has 
accepted that a licensee’s breach of a distribution clause in a licensing 
agreement can be considered as if the trademark owner had not given 
her consent under Article 7(1) to the distribution of the products, 
despite the fact that the products had been provided to the licensee 
directly by the trademark owner and that the products were distributed 
under the licensing agreement.121  Not surprisingly, the Court has 
developed this line of reasoning in cases dealing with luxury goods.  
Notably, the Court said, if a licensee sells luxury goods in a manner that 
 
117.  See Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421, at ¶¶ 25–26 (stating “[s]ince luxury goods are 
high-class goods, the aura of luxury emanating from them is essential in that it enables 
customers to distinguish them from similar goods. Therefore, an impairment to that aura of 
luxury is likely to affect the actual quality of those goods . . . it follows that it is conceivable 
that the sale of luxury goods by the licensee to third parties that are not part of the selective 
distribution network might affect the quality itself of those goods.”). 
118.  See Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss, 2001 E.C.R. I-8691; Sebago, 2 C.M.L.R. 1317. 
119.  Makro, 2009 E.C.R. I-10019; Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421; Coty Prestige, 2010 
E.C.R. I-04965; L’Oreal, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-324/09. 
120.  See L’Oreal, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-324/09; Coty Prestige, 2010 E.C.R. I-04965. 
121.  Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421. 
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breaches his licensing agreement, such breach of contract can preempt 
the application of the principle of trademark exhaustion because 
trademark owners did not consent to the sale of the trademarked items 
under Article 7(1).122  Ultimately, the CJEU has merged principles of 
contract law with the application of the principle of trademark 
exhaustion to deny that trademark rights are exhausted when licensees 
of luxury goods sell the products to “gray marketers” in violation of a 
distribution clause (expressed or possibly just implied) in the licensing 
agreement.  By adopting this position, however, the CJEU has severely 
weakened the effectiveness of the principle of trademark exhaustion 
and de facto jeopardized its application in the majority of cases dealing 
with gray market products distributed in the market. 
Equally problematic, the CJEU has expanded the number of 
grounds that may constitute “legitimate reasons” to oppose the further 
commercialization of the products after their first sale under Article 
7(2), even if such sale took place in the EEA.123  Once again, this 
expansion has invariably benefitted trademark owners, particularly the 
owners of famous and luxury marks.  In this respect, the CJEU has 
repeated, at first, that trademark owners can oppose this further 
commercialization of their products under Article 7(2) when the 
material condition of the goods has been changed or impaired.124  This 
would be the case, the Court said, if importers removed the product’s 
serial or identification numbers that had been applied to the products 
for legitimate purposes (not solely to prevent gray market products), or 
if the marked products have been repackaged by importers, apart from 
the cases of (pharmaceutical) products where the name of the 
 
122.  Id. at ¶ 51 (stating “Article 7(1) of the Directive is to be interpreted as meaning 
that a licensee who puts goods bearing a trade mark on the market in disregard of a provision 
in a license agreement does so without the consent of the proprietor of the trade mark where 
it is established that the provision in question is included in those listed in Article 8(2) of that 
Directive”). 
123.  Trademark Directive, supra note 2, at art. 7(2). 
124.  For previous decisions of the CJEU on the interpretation of Article 7(2), see also 
Joined Cases C-427, C-429 & C-436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova A/S, 1996 E.C.R. I-
3457, I-3536–45; Case C-379/97, Pharmacia & Upjohn SA v. Paranova A/S, 1999 E.C.R. I-
6927; Case C-349/95, Loendersloot v. Ballantine & Son Ltd., 1997 E.C.R. I-6227; Case C-
143/00, Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-3759; Case C-348/04, 
Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd., 2007 E.C.R. I-03391; Case C- 276/05, Wellcome 
Found. Ltd. v. Paranova Parmazeutika Handels GmbH, 2008 E.C.R. I-10479; see also Ansgar 
Only, Trade Marks and Parallel Importation—Recent Developments in European Law, 30 
I.I.C. 521, 516 (1999); Paul Torremans, New Repackaging Under the Trade Mark Directive of 
Well-established Exhaustion Principles, 11 E.I.P.R. 664 (1997). 
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repackaging company (or of the importing company which is controlling 
the repackaging company) is stated on the packaging and the actual 
quality of the products has not been altered.125  The Court has 
additionally stated, however, that “de-branding”—the removal of the 
trademark from the products—can amount to a “legitimate reason” for 
trademark owners to object to the further commercialization of the 
products under Article 7(2).126  Most problematically, the Court has 
indicated that trademark rights have not been exhausted, and trademark 
owners can oppose the further circulation of the goods when the use of 
the mark by the reseller could seriously damage the reputation of the 
mark.127  According to the Court, this can occur, for example, when the 
products are sold without authorization in discounted stores, if such 
sales can affect the “aura of luxury” and exclusivity of the products.128  
Similarly, the Court has stated that, while resellers can legitimately use 
the marks without the authorization of trademark owners to advertise 
their businesses,129 trademark owners can again oppose such advertising 
under Article 7(2) when it can affect the “aura of luxury” and 
exclusivity of the products.130 
Not surprisingly, trademark owners, in particular the owners of 
 
125.  In Loendersloot, 1997 E.C.R. I-6227, the CJEU said that importers could remove 
labels when these labels had been placed by trademark owners simply to control distribution 
and prevent parallel imports. See also Orafarm and Paranova, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009CJ0400:EN:HTML (stating 
“the new packaging must indicate clearly the repackager of the product, that requirement is 
justified by the trade mark proprietor’s interest in the consumer or end user not being let to 
believe that the proprietor is responsible for the repackaging.”). 
126.  Portakabin, 2010 E.C.R. I-06959, at ¶ 93 (stating “the national court . . . is obliged 
to find that there is such a legitimate reason where the reseller, without the consent of the 
proprietor . . . has removed reference to that trade mark from the goods, manufactured and 
placed on the market by that proprietor, and replaced it with a label bearing the reseller’s 
name, thereby concealing the trade mark”).    
127.  Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-3421 (stating that a trademark owner may oppose the 
unauthorized sale of luxury goods to discount stores by a licensee if the sale could damage the 
reputation of the mark). But see Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV, 
1997 E.C.R. I-6013 (where the CJEU applied, a few years earlier, trademark exhaustion to 
the use of trademarks in advertising). See also Portakabin, 2010 E.C.R. I-06959, at ¶ 93 
(stating “the national court . . . is obliged to find that a specialist reseller of second-hand 
goods under another person’s trade mark cannot be prohibited from using that mark to 
advertise . . . resale activities . . . unless the resale of those other goods . . . risks seriously 
damaging the image which the proprietor has succeeded in creating for its mark.”). 
128.  Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421, at ¶ 60. 
129.  Portakabin, 2010 E.C.R. I-06959, at ¶ 93. 
130.  Id. at ¶ 84. See also Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421; Case C-63/97, BMW v. Deenik, 
1999 E.C.R. I-00905, ¶¶ 50–55.  
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famous and luxury marks, have welcomed the CJEU’s recent decisions 
in this area.  With the exception of the cases related to the repackaging 
and distribution of pharmaceutical products, the CJEU’s recent 
decisions clearly indicate, in fact, that the Court is increasingly willing to 
narrow the interpretation of the principle of trademark exhaustion to 
protect famous marks and marks identifying luxury products.  Most 
relevantly, the Court seems increasingly willing to grant to luxury marks 
owners the ability to exert additional control over the distribution of 
their products within the EEA and ultimately prevent gray market 
products even within the EEA as long as trademark owners can prove 
that the unauthorized distribution of these products can affect the image 
and reputation of the marks.  Hence, although certainly greeted by 
trademark owners, these decisions are an unwelcome development in 
the jurisprudence of the CJEU and a clear threat for the correct 
functioning of the free movement of products in the EU/EEA.  
Moreover, these decisions directly go against the historical justifications 
of the principle of trademark exhaustion.  First, products should be free 
to circulate into the market after their first sale because trademark 
owners have already realized the economic value with respect to those 
products.  Second, trademark owners’ exclusive rights should be 
balanced with the proprietary rights of the buyers of the marked 
products, who should be allowed to resell or otherwise freely dispose of 
their properties after they have lawfully acquired them.131  Ultimately, 
these decisions are contrary to the historical justifications for trademark 
protection, which focuses on protecting consumers against confusion 
and competitors against unfair competition,132 and only indirectly 
protects trademark owners’ goodwill. 
Against the position that “[t]rademark law . . . has never protected 
the ability of trademark owners to design the condition under which 
 
131.  For an analysis of the theoretical foundation of the principle of trademark 
exhaustion, see TIMOTHY H. HIEBERT, PARALLEL IMPORTATION IN U.S. TRADEMARK 
LAW 1 (1994); Heath, supra note 15, at 623; Hilke, supra note 15, at 75; Charles Worth, Free 
Trade Agreements and the Exhaustion of Rights Principle, 1 E.I.P.R. 40 (1994). 
132.  See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–66 (1987) (“[T]rademark law . . . can best be explained 
on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic efficiency.”); see also Nicholas S. 
Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 526 (1988); William 
P. Kratzke, Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 199, 
205 (1991); Anselm Kamperman Sanders & Spyros M. Maniatis, A Consumer Trade Mark: 
Protection Based on Origin and Quality, 11 E.I.P.R. 406 (1993). 
CALBOLI- FORMATTED(2) (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2012  12:30 PM 
2012]      TRADEMARK EXHAUSTION: TEN YEARS LATER 279 
 
 
products are released into the market,”133 the CJEU’s recent decisions 
favor, instead, the corporate view that trademark law should protect 
primarily, if not exclusively, business goodwill, rather than consumers 
and market competition.  This conclusion seems particularly true with 
respect to the CJEU’s decisions where the products at issue were sold 
under marks whose business success depends on an “aura of luxury” 
and exclusivity, which can be affected by the unauthorized sale of the 
products in discount stores.134  If confirmed in future decisions, however, 
this line of reasoning from the CJEU would directly amount to overly 
rewarding trademark owners to the detriment of competition in the 
marketplace, which could result, in turn, in increased market prices for 
luxury products.135  Ultimately, whether luxury products are bought in a 
high-end store or in a discount store, as long as the quality of the 
products has not been materially altered, products remain the same 
(apart from the variations in market price in the different stores).  
Likewise, the marks that identify the products continue to perform the 
traditional and legally protected trademark functions—indicating 
commercials origin and guaranteeing consistent products quality— 
regardless of the fact that the products are sold in different types of 
stores.  As Professor Sir Robin Jacob (formerly Lord Justice of the 
Court of Appeal of England and Wales) said, “[s]ometime[s] [it seems] 
that the law may be losing a sense of reality in this area—we are, after 
all, only considering the use of the owners’ trademark for his goods in 
perfect condition.”136  Undoubtedly, as Professor Sir Jacob observed, 
“[t]he pickle the law has got into [in this area] would . . . astonish the 
average consumer,”137 and this is certainly most unfortunate and should 
be considered highly problematic for consumers, market competition, 
 
133.  Calboli, supra note 4, at 1250 (citing Beier, supra note 15, at 61–62). 
134.  Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-03421, at ¶ 60.  In general, with respect to the risks of 
shifting trademark protection in favor of protecting trademarks per se, see also Gert-Jan Van 
De Kamp, Protection of Trade Marks: The New Regime – Beyond Origin?, 1998 E.I.P.R. 364; 
Helen Norman, Perfume, Whisky and Leaping Cats of Prey: A U.K. Perspective on Three 
Recent Trade Mark Cases Before the European Court of Justice, 1998 E.I.P.R. 306 (1998); 
Paul Walsh et al., Parallel Imports: Labelling and Advertising Trademarked Products, 
TRADEMARK WORLD, Feb. 1998, at 20. 
135.  See, e.g., Beier, Territoriality of Trademark Law, supra note 15, at 72 (“[T]hese 
economic interests are not protected by trademark law.  They can only be considered within 
the framework of the law against unfair competition, by contract law, and the law of torts.”). 
136.  Boehringer Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd., [2004] 3 C.M.L.R. 3, ¶ 78. The 
Court of Appeal of England and Wales referred this case to the CJEU. See Case C-348/04, 
Boehringer Ingelheim KG and Others v. Swingward Ltd and Others, [2007] ECR I-03391. 
137.  Boehringer Ingelheim, [2004] 3 C.M.L.R. 3, ¶ 78. 
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and the free movement of products in the EEA. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In my 2002 article, I concluded by saying that there was “little hope 
left for those who favor International exhaustion in the EU” after the 
decisions of the CJEU on the interpretation of the geographical 
application of Article 7(1).  Ten years later, I conclude this Essay by 
saying that the recent decisions of the CJEU go even further than 
simply confirming the principle of EEA-wide exhaustion as the 
exclusive criterion to apply to trademark exhaustion in the EEA.  
Notably, these decisions seem to indicate the willingness of the Court to 
interpret the application of the principle of trademark exhaustion 
restrictively, even with respect to intra-EEA parallel trade. In 
particular, the CJEU seems to have adopted an increasingly narrow 
interpretation of the notion of “consent” under Article 7(1) and has 
consistently ruled that without trademark owners’ “unequivocally 
expressed consent,” products cannot be considered legitimately 
distributed into the EEA (and trademark rights cannot be considered 
exhausted).  Most problematically, the CJEU has clearly sided with the 
owners of luxury trademarks, and has stated that trademark owners can 
oppose the further distribution of their products under the rule of 
Article 7(2), even after the first sale of these products in the EEA, when 
parallel importers distribute these products in ways that may detriment 
the image and the prestige of the products and trademark owners. 
In a world where corporations are vociferously opposing gray 
market products in order to prevent the arbitrage of consumer goods 
across different jurisdictions, or simply through unauthorized retail 
chains and distributors in the same EEA jurisdiction, these 
jurisprudential developments barely come as a surprise.  Still, this 
judicial trend is unwelcome.  Trademark owners have always desired to 
control the distribution of their marked products after their first sale in 
the market, yet trademark law and policy have never intended to grant 
trademark owners this control.  The principle of trademark exhaustion 
specifically opposes this control.  Even before the adoption of the 
Trademark Directive and Article 7, European law makers and the 
CJEU carefully balanced the exercise of the exclusive rights of 
trademark owners with the principle of free movement of goods in the 
European internal market by recurring at first, to European competition 
law provisions, and then to the provisions protecting the free movement 
of products in the EU.  Hence, the CJEU’s shift towards narrowing the 
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interpretation of “trademark owners’ consent” under Article 7(1), and 
in favor of broadening the interpretation of “legitimate reasons” under 
Article 7(2), directly stifles the application of the principle of trademark 
exhaustion under Article 7, even within the EEA.  Ultimately, such shift 
is unwelcome as it goes against the letter, the legislative history, and the 
spirit of Article 7.  Moreover, it negatively impacts the free movement 
of products within the EEA and overly rewards trademark owners to 
the detriment of consumers and market competition, even after 
trademark owners have already realized the commercial value of their 
marks with the first sale of the marked products in the EEA. 
 
